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The Impact of Tax Reform on Corporate Capital Investment: 




We examine the impact of tax reform on corporate capital investment in Australia 
spanning the Ralph Review of Business Taxation reform. Based on panel data, our 
results indicate that corporate capital investment reduced because of the tax reform. 
The negative effects of the removal of accelerated depreciation exceeded the positive 
effects of the decrease in the corporate tax rate, hence corporate capital investment 
declined. Moreover, the decline was broad-based as it occurred across all major 
industry sectors. These findings remain robust to an alternate measure of corporate 
capital investment. 
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1. Introduction 
Prior U.S. research has examined the impact of tax reform on corporate capital 
investment. Kern (1994) studied the redistribution of corporate plant and equipment 
under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. This Act contained several provisions 
that aimed to stimulate corporate capital investment. 1  The results showed that 
corporations which received the largest tax benefits due to the tax reform increased 
their capital investment spending the most. Cummins and Hassett (1992) examined 
the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on corporate capital investment,2 and found 
a significant negative association between the cost of capital and plant and equipment 
investment. Finally, Cummins et al. (1994) analyzed corporate capital investment 
behavior in terms of all major U.S. tax reforms between 1962 to 1986. The results 
indicated that corporations that faced the greatest change in tax incentives related to 
corporate capital investment reacted the most. 
There is a lack of research on corporate capital investment in other countries. 
However, major corporate tax reform proposals by the Ralph Review of Business 
Taxation were presented to the Australian Government on 30 July 1999. This provides 
a unique opportunity to treat this tax policy event as a natural experiment to study the 
likely impact of major tax reform on corporate capital investment in Australia. Several 
of the Ralph Review’s key proposals could potentially affect corporate capital 
investment. Accelerated depreciation was proposed for removal. Moreover, a 
phased-in reduction of the corporate tax rate was also suggested. The Australian 
Government accepted both proposals, and they were codified in the Income Tax 
Assessment Act (1997), with application from the 1999–2000 tax year. 
                                                 
1 The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 approved accelerated depreciation provisions, modified the 
investment tax credit regime and extended the net operating loss carryover time period and included 
safe harbor leasing provisions. 
2 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 extended depreciation lifetimes, repealed the investment tax credit and 
lowered corporate tax rates. 
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Based on panel data spanning the Ralph Review tax reform, we find evidence of a 
significant negative association between the tax reform and corporate capital 
investment after controlling for corporation-specific and industry sector variables in 
our regression model. This association indicates that corporate capital investment 
decreased as a result of the tax reform. The negative effects of the removal of 
accelerated depreciation surpassed the positive effects of the decrease in the corporate 
tax rate, so corporate capital investment decreased. Our findings also show that the 
reduction in corporate capital investment was widespread as it occurred across all 
major industry sectors. Finally, these results remain robust to an alternate measure of 
corporate capital investment. 
An important contribution of our study is that it is the first to confirm an 
association between the Ralph Review tax reform and corporate capital investment, 
and extends our understanding of the impact of tax reform on corporate capital 
investment. By examining the impact of tax reform on corporate capital investment, 
government policymakers can make more informed decisions about tax policy as it 
relates to corporate capital investment. Moreover, unlike prior studies that use a 
balance sheet measure of corporate capital investment, this study employs a cash flow 
statement measure, so our results should be more reliable. Finally, our study differs 
from previous studies by using panel data estimation models which adjust for 
corporation-specific and time-specific effects, so we are able to account for the impact 
of other variables on corporate capital investment not explicitly included in our study. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two evaluates the 
Ralph Review tax reform on corporate capital investment and leads to the 
development of hypotheses. Section three describes the research design. Section four 
reports the empirical results. Finally, Section five presents the conclusion. 
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2. The Ralph review, corporate capital investment and hypotheses development 
The Ralph Review’s primary objective was to advocate basic design changes to 
the corporate tax system (Ralph, 1999, p. 10). Several of its key proposals could 
potentially affect a corporation’s capital investment decisions. 
The most important corporate capital investment tax reform was the replacement 
of accelerated depreciation with an “effective life” regime based on the economic life 
of an asset (Ralph, 1999, pp. 305-308). The removal of accelerated depreciation has 
the potential to significantly alter a corporation’s incentive to invest in fixed assets. 
Because plant and equipment lives are extended for tax write-off purposes, this 
increases the tax burden for corporate purchases of plant and equipment (Cummins 
and Hassett, 1992, p. 244). 
 Another significant tax reform was the reduction in the corporate tax rate from 
36% to 34% in the 2000–2001 tax year, and from 34% to 30% in the 2001–2002 tax 
year and thereafter. The Ralph Review considered the phased-in reduction of the 
corporate tax rate as a major trade-off to corporations to compensate for the removal 
of accelerated depreciation (Ralph, 1999, p. 425). A reduction in the corporate tax rate 
increases the net after-tax cash flows from investment, and makes investment in fixed 
assets more appealing to corporations (Black et al, 2000, p. 44). 
The affect of the Ralph Review on corporate capital investment in Australia is 
tested with the following hypothesis: 
H1:  The removal of accelerated depreciation and the reduction in the corporate 
tax rate significantly impacted corporate capital investment in Australia. 
Because of the potentially offsetting effects of the removal of accelerated 
depreciation on the one hand, and a reduction in the corporate tax rate on the other, 
we cannot predict with certainty the directional impact on corporate capital 
investment, so we formally test the following hypotheses: 
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H2a:  If the negative effects of the removal of accelerated depreciation exceeded 
the positive effects of the reduction in the corporate tax rate, corporate 
capital investment in Australia decreased due to the tax reform. 
H2b:  If the positive effects of the reduction in the corporate tax rate exceeded 
the negative effects of the removal of accelerated depreciation, corporate 
capital investment in Australia increased due to the tax reform. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Sample selection and data 
Our sample consists of a single panel of publicly listed Australian corporations 
collected from the Aspect Financial Database over the period 1997–2003. The year 
2000 was excluded because it is a transitional tax year in terms of the Ralph Review 
proposals. It has been shown in prior research (e.g., Dhaliwal and Wang, 1992; 
Scholes et al., 1992; Guenther, 1994) that corporations generally respond to tax 
legislation changes one year after tax legislation becomes operative. The final sample 
consists of 222 corporations (1,332 corporation years) after excluding: 
(a) Financial corporations as government regulation faced by these corporations is 
likely to systematically affect their capital investment decisions differently from 
other corporations. 
(b) Foreign corporations because these corporations’ investment decisions might be 
influenced by home country tax laws which are different from Australian tax laws. 
(c) Corporations with missing data, outliers and/or no activity corporations. 
A summary of the sample reconciliation for the data panel is reported in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
3.2. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable for our empirical tests is represented by corporate capital 
investment (CINV). Two measures of CINV are documented in the literature (e.g., 
Cummins and Hassett, 1992; Kern, 1994; Black et al., 2000). The first is the change in 
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gross property, plant and equipment collected from a corporation’s balance sheet. The 
second is the amount of cash spent on capital expenditures taken from a corporation’s 
cash flow statement. Data obtained from the cash flow statement is acknowledged to 
be superior because it is the most accurate (Kern, 1994, p. 234; Black et al., 2000, p. 
43). This measure of CINV is available in the Aspect Financial Database, and is used 
in our study. To be consistent with Kern (1994) and Black et al. (2000), we scale 
CINV by total sales to obtain a measure of corporate capital investment that controls 
for inflation and growth. Hence, we measure corporate capital investment as the 
amount of cash spent on capital expenditures divided by total sales.3 
 
3.3. Independent variables 
The independent variables are classified as tax variables, corporation-specific 
variables and industry sector variables. The tax variables included are designed to 
capture the impact of the Ralph Review tax reform on corporate capital investment in 
Australia. Moreover, there are several corporation-specific variables that could affect 
the capital investment behavior of corporations, hence we also control for these 
variables in our study. Finally, there could be a change in investment patterns across 
industry sectors because of the removal of accelerated depreciation, so it is also 
necessary to control for industry sector effects. 
 
3.3.1. Tax variables 
The tax variable of primary interest in this study is represented by the Ralph 
Review tax reform (TREF). Consequently, TREF is denoted by a period dummy 
variable coded as 1 in the years in which the tax reforms took effect and 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
3 Previous research by Kinney and Trezevant (1993) and Kern (1994) finds that various deflators have 
no impact on the empirical results. 
 8
No sign prediction is made for TREF owing to the potentially offsetting effects of the 
removal of accelerated depreciation and the reduction in the corporate tax rate. 
The corporate tax rate (CRATE) can also influence a corporation’s investment 
decisions, so CRATE is included in our study to account for this effect. The predicted 
sign for this variable is ambiguous. The Ralph Review reduced the corporate tax rate, 
thus as the value of an additional tax shield is a function of a corporation’s marginal 
tax rate, a decreased corporate tax rate should cause less investment in fixed assets. 
Alternatively, reducing the corporate tax rate can also increase the net after-tax cash 
flows from an investment, and makes investment in fixed assets more attractive.4 
As a corporation’s taxable income decreases, the risk of incurring a net operating 
loss (NOL) for tax purposes increases, which results in a lower projected marginal tax 
rate. Corporations with low taxable incomes may respond differently to tax reforms 
that reduce depreciation rates and lower corporate tax rates. Likewise, the incentives 
provided by tax shields or lower corporate tax rates diminish as a corporation’s 
marginal tax rate decreases. To capture the effects of low marginal corporate tax rates, 
a dummy variable coded as 1 for a NOL corporation and 0 otherwise is included. We 
classify a corporation is as a NOL corporation in this study if it reported a net 
operating loss during the previous year, the current year or the following year. The 
predicted sign for this variable is negative since a NOL corporation’s capital 
investment opportunities may be affected adversely by its loss-making status. 
An interaction term denoted by NOL multiplied by CRATE (NOL*CRATE) is 
included to more effectively account for the effects of tax rate changes on corporate 
capital investment. The effects of tax rate changes on corporate capital investment are 
                                                 
4 It is also possible that individual tax rates can indirectly affect the corporate cost of capital due to 
their impact on required pre-tax rates of return (Black et al., 2000, p. 44). However, there has been no 
change in Australia’s top marginal individual tax rate of 47% over the 1997–2003 sample period, so 
this variable was not included in our study. 
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likely to be a function of a corporation’s marginal tax rate (Black et al., 2000, p. 44). 
There is no sign prediction for this variable. 
Another interaction term for the tax variables is represented by NOL multiplied by 
TREF (NOL*TREF). In particular, NOL corporations may be affected in a different 
way to profitable corporations due to the Ralph Review tax reform, so an interaction 
term is included for NOL and TREF. There is no sign prediction for this variable. 
 
3.3.2. Corporation-specific variables 
The market to book (MKTBK) ratio is an important estimate of a corporation’s 
investment opportunity set (Smith and Watts, 1992, p. 44). It is measured as the 
market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. The predicted sign for the 
MKTBK ratio is negative as it captures the difference between a corporation’s return 
on both existing and future assets and its required rate of return on equity, so a lower 
MKTBK ratio suggests greater investment opportunities that are expected to yield 
returns in excess of the required rate of return (Collins and Kothari, 1989, p. 166). 
In an efficient market, capital is provided to corporations that have superior 
investment opportunities (Smith and Watts, 1992, p. 264). However, while the 
MKTBK ratio is a direct proxy measure of investment opportunity, it is sensitive to a 
corporation’s capital structure (Black et al., 2000, p. 45). Hence, the debt to equity 
(DE) ratio is included here to control for the effects of financial leverage and capital 
structure (Gupta and Newberry, 1997, p. 13). It is measured as long-term debt divided 
by total equity (both at book values). There is no predicted sign for this variable. 
A capital intensive corporation is more likely to adjust its investment decision 
based on tax reform than a non-capital intensive corporation (Courtenay et al., 1989, 
pp. 289-291), so capital intensity (CINT) is included as a control variable. It is 
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measured as property, plant and equipment divided by total assets (both at book 
values). CINT is predicted to have a positive sign. Given the tax benefits normally 
associated with capital investment, capital-intensive corporations should invest more 
in fixed assets (Black et al., 2000, p. 45). 
Corporation size (SIZE) can affect a corporation’s ability to finance additional 
investment (Smith and Watts, 1992, p. 267) and therefore should also be included as a 
control variable. Corporation size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets 
(at book value). There is no predicted sign for this variable. 
Return on assets (ROA) represents an important measure of a corporation’s 
performance and is used to control for corporate profitability (Gupta and Newberry, 
1997, p. 15). It is measured as net profit before tax divided by total assets. The 
predicted sign for this variable is positive since an increase in return on assets should 
indicate an increase in corporate capital investment due to higher pre-tax income. 
Cash Flow (CF) is a key measure of a corporation’s ability to internally finance its 
capital investments. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995, pp. 566-567) show that cash 
flow impacts on a corporation’s capital investment. Specifically, a corporation with a 
large cash flow ratio is more likely to be able to increase capital investment than a 
corporation with a small cash flow ratio. Hence, CF is included here as a control 
variable, and is measured as operating cash flow divided by total sales. The predicted 
sign for this variable is positive. 
Lagged corporate capital investment (LCINV) in any given year should be 
correlated with corporate capital investment in the following year due to, for example, 
different industry characteristics and the various life stages of different corporations 
(Black et al., 2000, p. 45). Thus, a measure of corporate capital investment for the 
previous year is included. It is denoted by the amount of cash spent on capital 
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expenditures for the prior year divided by total sales to be consistent with our 
dependent variable. There is no sign prediction for this variable because it is possible 
that corporate capital investment may be cyclical, with large investments followed by 
periods of lower investment (Black et al., 2000, p. 45). 
 
3.3.3. Industry sector variables 
Prior research shows that corporate capital investment fluctuates across different 
industry sectors (e.g., Auerbach and Hassett, 1991; Cummins and Hassett, 1992; 
Cummins et al., 1994). Industry sector (INSEC) dummy variables defined at the 
two-digit Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) code level are included.5 An 
analysis with more discrete GICS classifications was not possible due to the steep 
decline in sample size by industry sector. The predicted sign for the INSEC dummy 
variables can be either negative (service industry sectors) or positive (non-service 
industries). However, we make no sign predictions because the INSEC dummy 
variables are only defined at the two-digit GICS code level, so many of the industry 
sector categories comprise a mix of service and non-service corporations. A summary 
of the industry reconciliation is provided in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Finally, Auerbach and Hassett (1991, p. 202) find that industry sectors may be 
impacted differently because of tax reform that amends fixed asset depreciation 
write-offs. This could occur as a direct result of the Ralph Review tax reform which 
removed accelerated depreciation. Interaction terms are included in our regression 
model by multiplying each INSEC dummy variable by TREF (INSEC*TREF). No 
sign predictions are made for these interaction terms. 
                                                 
5 The INSEC dummy variables are represented by the energy, materials, industrials, consumer 
discretionary, consumer staples, heath care, information technology, telecommunication and utilities 
industry sectors, with utilities being the omitted sector in the regression model. 
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3.4. Regression model 
Our empirical analysis involves estimating the following regression model: 
CINVit = α0 + β1TREFit + β2itCRATE + β3NOLit + β4NOL*TREFit + 
β5NOL*CRATEit + β6MKTBKit + β7DEit + β8CINTit + β9SIZEit       
+ β10ROAit + β11CFit + β12LCINVit + β13-20INSECit + 
β21-28INSEC*TREFit + εit                              (1) 
where the dependent variable, CINVit is the level of corporate capital investment for 
corporation i in year t and the independent variables represent proxies for tax effects 
(TREF, CRATE, NOL, NOL*TREF and NOL*CRATE), corporation-specific effects 
(MKTBK, DE, CINT, SIZE, ROA, CF and LCINV) and industry sector effects 
(INSEC and INSEC*TREF). Lastly, financial statement data collected from the 
Aspect Financial Database are used to compute all variables. 
 
3.5. Panel data estimation techniques 
Our regression model is estimated using panel data. While it is possible to use a 
simple-pooled ordinary least squares model (OLSM) on panel data, this technique 
may not be optimal (e.g., Hsiao, 2003; Baltagi, 2005). The OLSM cannot adjust for 
corporation-specific and time-specific effects which might result in an omitted 
variables bias and an incorrectly specified model. Thus, we also estimate the fixed 
effects model (FEM) and random effects model (REM), and choose the most 
appropriate model based on statistical tests. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
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Our dependent variable CINV has a mean of .074 and a range of 0 to 1.490, so the 
variation is reasonable. The independent variables are denoted by tax variables and 
corporation-specific variables. For the tax variables, TREF has a mean of .500 and a 
range of 0 to 1, CRATE has a mean of .337 and a range of .300 to .360, and NOL has 
a mean of .269 and a range of 0 to 1. Hence, there is adequate variation in the tax 
variables. For the corporation-specific variables, they have a reasonable amount of 
variation. MKTBK has a mean of 1.963 and a range of -19.610 to 42.190, ROA has a 
mean of .100 and a range of 0 to 1.573, and CINT has a mean of .354 and a range of 0 
to .957. An acceptable range of variation is observed for all variables as well as 
consistency between the means and medians. 
 
4.2. Correlation matrix 
The Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables is 
presented in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
The Pearson correlation matrix shows that there are a number of significant 
associations between the independent variables and CINV. For the tax variables, 
significant correlations are found between TREF and CINV (p < .01), CRATE and 
CINV (p < .01) and NOL and CINV (p < .10). In addition, for the corporation-specific 
variables, significant correlations are observed between MKTBK and CINV (p < .01), 
CINT and CINV (p < .01), SIZE and CINV (p < .01), ROA and CINV (p < .01), CF 
and CINV (p < .01) and LCINV and CINV (p < .01). 
Table 4 also indicates that moderate levels of collinearity exist between the 
independent variables. However, one high correlation is found between TREF and 
CRATE (r = -.868; p < .01). This high correlation was expected since a major part of 
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the Ralph Review tax reform was a reduction in the corporate tax rate. This high 
correlation makes it more difficult to find results on our major tax variable: TREF. 
Still, if we did not include CRATE in our study, we could not distinguish between the 
effects of the removal of accelerated depreciation and corporate tax rate changes. 
Variance inflation factors (VIFs) are computed when estimating the regression model. 
No VIFs exceed ten which is acceptable (Hair et al., 1998, p. 220). 
 
4.3. Regression results 
We obtain regression model estimates for OLSM, FEM and REM. Still, three 
statistical tests are computed to ascertain the most appropriate model to use: the 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) test, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test and the Hausman test 
(see e.g., Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Breusch and Pagan, 1980; Hausman, 1978). The 
results of the LR and LM tests are significant (p < .01), suggesting that both FEM and 
REM outperform OLSM. Based on the Hausman test, REM is also found to be 
superior to FEM (p > .05). Given the better model specification of REM, we only 
report these results in our paper. Table 5 summarizes the REM regression results 
which consider the impact of the Ralph Review tax reform on corporate capital 
investment after controlling for corporation-specific and industry sector effects. 
Significance of the estimates is based on White (1980) corrected standard errors. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Table 5 reports that the regression model is significant at the p < .01 level (Wald 
Chi2 = 1,259.64), while the adj. R2 is .27. Regarding the significance of the regression 
coefficients for the tax variables, TREF has a significant negative association with 
CINV (p < .01), and indicates that the Ralph Review tax reform significantly reduced 
corporate capital investment in Australia. These results provide support for H1 and 
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more specifically, for H2a. The negative effects of the removal of accelerated 
depreciation exceeded the positive effects of the reduction in the corporate tax rate, so 
corporate capital investment declined. Finally, Table 5 shows that the coefficients for 
CRATE, NOL, NOL*TREF and NOL*CRATE are insignificant. 
As to the significance of the regression coefficients for the corporation-specific 
variables, Table 5 shows that several of them are significant. CINT is included in our 
study to control for corporate investment decisions. As expected, it has a significant 
positive association with CINV (p < .01). Capital-intensive corporations invest more 
in fixed assets than non-capital-intensive corporations. SIZE is included in our study 
to control for the ability of corporations to finance additional investment. SIZE has a 
significant positive association with CINV (p < .01). Large corporations are better 
able to finance capital investment than small corporations. ROA is included in our 
study as a control for corporate profitability. As expected, the results show that it has a 
significant positive association with CINV (p < .05), suggesting that profitable 
corporations undertake more capital investment than less profitable corporations. CF 
represents another control variable in our study, and is a measure of the ability of 
corporations to finance their capital investments from internal sources. As expected, 
CF has a significant positive association with CINV (p < .01). Corporations with large 
cash flows are able to increase their capital investment more than corporations with 
small cash flows. Our final corporation-specific variable is denoted by LCINV. It is 
included in our study as a control since lagged capital investment for corporations in 
any given year should be correlated with corporate capital investment in the next year. 
LCINV has a significant positive association with CINV (p < .10). Lagged capital 
investment for corporations is followed by more corporate capital investment in the 
following year. Finally, the coefficients for MKTBK and DE are insignificant. 
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Our regression model also includes INSEC dummy variables because corporate 
capital investment can fluctuate across different industry sectors. In terms of the 
significance of the regression coefficients for the INSEC dummy variables: energy, 
materials, industrials, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, heath care, 
information technology and telecommunication, Table 5 reports that each of them has 
a significant positive association with CINV (p < .01). These results show that the 
industry sectors are generally related to corporate capital investment. Moreover, for 
the coefficients of the interaction terms between the INSEC dummy variables and 
TREF, Table 5 reports that they all have a significant negative association with CINV 
(p < .01). These results suggest that the association between the INSEC dummy 
variables and CINV underwent a fundamental change due to the tax reform. There 
was a broad-based decline in corporate capital investment across all industry sectors 
because of the Ralph Review. 
 
4.4. Robustness check 
Our dependent variable, CINV is measured as the amount of cash spent on capital 
expenditures because this is recognized in the literature as the superior measure (e.g., 
Kern, 1994; Black et al., 2000). As a robustness check of our regression results, we 
re-estimated our regression model using the alternate measure of CINV: change in 
gross property, plant and equipment, as our dependent variable. We also scaled this 
particular measure of CINV by total sales to control for inflation and growth. 
The REM regression results, not reported, indicate that the coefficient estimates 
have identical signs and generally the same level of statistical significance. However, 
several of the coefficients for the industry sectors (i.e., energy, materials, industrials, 
consumer discretionary and information technology) were found to be insignificant. 
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In addition, the explanatory power of the regression model (Wald Chi2 = 90.77, 
significant at the p < .01 level; adj. R2 = .10) is considerably less when using the 
alternate measure of CINV. These results show the benefit of using a cash flow based 
measure of corporate capital investment in this line of research. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We examine the impact of the Ralph Review of Business Taxation reform on 
corporate capital investment in Australia. Based on panel data spanning the tax reform, 
we find evidence of a significant negative association between the tax reform and 
corporate capital investment. This result suggests that corporate capital investment 
decreased as a result of the tax reform. The negative effects of the removal of 
accelerated depreciation exceeded the positive effects of the decrease in the corporate 
tax rate, so corporate capital investment declined. The regression results also show 
that the decline in corporate capital investment was broad-based as it occurred across 
all major industry sectors. These findings remain robust to an alternate measure of 
corporate capital investment. 
Our study is the first to validate an association between the Ralph Review tax 
reform and corporate capital investment in Australia, and extends our knowledge of 
the impact of tax reform on corporate capital investment. By examining the impact of 
tax reform on corporate capital investment, government policymakers are able to 
make more informed decisions about tax policy as it affects corporate capital 
investment. Our results also lend support to the value of using a cash flow based 
measure of corporate capital investment. Finally, this study shows the merit of 
employing panel data estimation models which adjust for corporation-specific and 
time-specific effects to analyze corporate capital investment. 
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 This study is subject to several limitations. First, a common problem in this area 
of research is that major tax reforms seldom represent discrete events. Rather, they 
typically include changes with potentially off-setting effects. Moreover, time lags 
caused by political debates and actual implementation of enacted tax law changes 
produce many timing and measurement issues. Still, we have considered acceptable 
alternatives on how and when several of our variables are measured. Second, the 
sample is drawn from publicly listed corporations. Due to data unavailability, it was 
not possible to include non-listed corporations in our sample. Finally, our corporate 
capital investment model may be incomplete. While every effort was made to control 
for major non-tax variables in our model, there may be other variables that could 
affect corporate capital investment. However, an advantage of the panel data 
estimation techniques used in our study is that they possibly account for these other 
variables. Future research could investigate these issues in further detail. 
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All corporations in the Aspect Financial Database 1,743 
Less:  
Financial institutions and foreign corporations (24) 
Corporations with missing data, outliers and/or no activity (1,497) 
Final sample (number of corporations) 222 
Final sample (corporation years) 1,332 










Energy 7 42 3 
Materials 54 324 24 
Industrials 53 318 23 
Consumer Discretionary 54 324 24 
Consumer Staples 28 168 13 
Heath Care 14 84 7 
Information Technology 3 18 2 
Telecommunication Services 2 12 1 
Utilities† 7 42 3 
Totals 222 1,332 100% 
†Omitted sector in the regression analysis. 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics (n = 1,332 corporation years) 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
CINV .074 .073 .123 0 1.490 
TREF .500 .500 .501 0 1 
CRATE .337 .350 .027 .300 .360 
NOL .269 .243 .443 0 1 
MKTBK 1.963 1.340 2.812 -19.610 42.190 
DE .436 .289 1.585 -11.079 39.692 
CINT .354 .327 .207 0 .957 
SIZE 18.832 18.524 1.970 13.700 24.735 
ROA .100 .073 .126 0 1.573 
CF .023 .022 1.031 -32.987 1.457 
LCINV .099 .041 .363 0 9.590 
Definition of variables: CINV is cash spent on capital expenditures divided by total sales; TREF is a 
dummy variable coded as 1 in the years in which the tax reforms took effect and 0 otherwise; CRATE 
is the statutory corporate tax rate; NOL is a dummy variable coded as 1 if a corporation reported a net 
operating loss during the previous year, the current year or the following year and 0 otherwise; 
MKTBK is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity; DE is long-term debt 
divided by total equity; CINT is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets; ROA is net profit before tax divided by total assets; CF is operating 
cash flow divided by total sales; and LCINV is the amount of cash spent on capital expenditures for the 
prior year divided by total sales. 
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Table 4 
Pearson correlation matrix (n = 1,332 corporation years) 
 
 CINV TREF CRATE NOL MKTBK DE CINT SIZE ROA CF LCINV 
C  INV 1           
TREF -.070*** 1          
CRATE .080*** -.868*** 1         
NOL -.047* .088*** -.072*** 1        
MKTBK .071*** .029 -.021 -.007 1       
DE .007 -.004 .009 -.035 .137*** 1      
CINT .235*** -.075*** .067** -.089*** -.101*** .022 1     
SIZE .079*** .077*** -.068** -.369*** .003 .140*** .134*** 1    
ROA .168*** .009 -.030 -.149*** .436*** -.044 -.079*** -.243*** 1   
CF .142*** .018 -.018 -.155*** -.024 .002 .085*** .139*** -.176*** 1  
LCINV .345*** -.036 .055** .102*** .086*** -.001 .038 -.032 .184*** -.136*** 1 
Definition of variables: CINV is cash spent on capital expenditures divided by total sales; TREF is a dummy variable coded as 1 in the years in which the tax 
reforms took effect and 0 otherwise; CRATE is the statutory corporate tax rate; NOL is a dummy variable coded as 1 if a corporation reported a net operating 
loss during the previous year, the current year or the following year and 0 otherwise; MKTBK is the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity; DE is long-term debt divided by total equity; CINT is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets; ROA is net profit before tax divided by total assets; CF is operating cash flow divided by total sales; and LCINV is the amount of cash spent on capital 
expenditures for the prior year divided by total sales. 
*, **, *** Significant at .10, .05 and .01 levels. Two-tailed (one-tailed) tests are used for non-directional (directional) predictions. 
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Table 5 
Regression results (n = 1,332 corporation years) 
 
CINVit = α0 + β1TREFit + β2itCRATE + β3NOLit + β4NOL*TREFit + β5NOL*CRATEit + 
β6MKTBKit + β7DEit + β8CINTit + β9SIZEit + β10ROAit + β11CFit + β12LCINVit + β13-20-INSECit 
+ β21-28INSEC*TREFit + εit 
 





Intercept  .210 .158 1.33 
TREF ? -.411 .143 -2.87*** 
CRATE ? .218 .145 1.50 
NOL - -.067 .235 -.29 
NOL*TREF ? .023 .037 .62 
NOL*CRATE ? .194 .651 .30 
MKTBK - .001 .002 .50 
DE ? -.001 .002 -.50 
CINT + .131 .016 8.19*** 
SIZE ? .007 .002 3.50*** 
ROA + .125 .071 1.76** 
CF + .014 .004 3.50*** 
LCINV ? .092 .055 1.67* 
INSEC     
Energy ? .359 .144 2.49*** 
Materials ? .391 .143 2.73*** 
Industrials ? .418 .143 2.92*** 
Consumer Discretionary ? .399 .144 2.77*** 
Consumer Staples ? .412 .143 2.88*** 
Heath Care ? .415 .143 2.90*** 
Information Technology ? .395 .145 2.72*** 
Telecommunication Services ? .403 .146 2.76*** 
INSEC*TREF     
Energy*TREF ? -.408 .147 -2.78*** 
Materials*TREF ? -.404 .144 -2.81*** 
Industrials*TREF ? -.416 .143 -2.91*** 
Consumer Discretionary*TREF ? -.402 .144 -2.79*** 
Consumer Staples*TREF ? -.402 .143 -2.81*** 
Heath Care*TREF ? -.412 .143 -2.88*** 
Information Technology*TREF ? -.396 .145 -2.73*** 
Telecommunication Services*TREF ? -.475 .166 -2.86*** 
     
Adj. R2 .27    
Wald Chi2 1,259.64    
(two-tailed p value) .01    
Definition of variables: CINV is cash spent on capital expenditures divided by total sales; TREF is a 
dummy variable coded as 1 in the years in which the tax reforms took effect and 0 otherwise; CRATE is 
the statutory corporate tax rate; NOL is a dummy variable coded as 1 if a corporation reported a net 
operating loss during the previous year, the current year or the following year and 0 otherwise; 
NOL*TREF is an interaction term; NOL*CRATE is an interaction term; MKTBK is the market value of 
equity divided by the book value of equity; DE is long-term debt divided by total equity; CINT is 
property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA 
is net profit before tax divided by total assets; CF is operating cash flow divided by total sales; and 
LCINV is the amount of cash spent on capital expenditures for the prior year divided by total sales; 
INSEC is a series of industry sector dummy variables; and INSEC*TREF is an interaction term. 
*, **, *** Significant at .10, .05 and .01 levels. Two-tailed (one-tailed) tests are used for non-directional 
(directional) predictions. 
aWhite (1980) corrected standard errors. 
